The simplicity principle commonly referred to as Occam’s razor, believes that more straightforward interpretations of observations should be favored over more complicated ones. The concept has been clarified in recent decades by introducing current ideas of computing and probability, giving a more explicit understanding of how precisely complexity reduction promotes inference. The simple basic concept has found various applications in contemporary cognitive research in situations as varied as perception, classification, reasoning, and neuroscience. In all these domains, the fundamental assumption is that the imagination seeks the most straightforward accessible interpretation of data— or, more correctly, it balances a tendency towards simplicity with a slightly opposite restriction to pick models congruent with perceptual or cognitive findings. The essay examines the applications of the simplicity principle throughout cognitive research, stressing how complexity reduction in various forms has been included in generative models of inference based on the argument between Berkeley and Russell.
Assume Berkeley is correct, that the only tangible things are sense-data, and that objects do not exist until we see them. So, how are we going to explain my cat’s movements? It was in one section of the room when I last looked at it. Now that I have looked up from my desk, I see it is on the opposite side of the room. How did it move through one corner of the wall to the other if it did not exist while I was not aware of it? Is the cat employing a known micro that I am not aware of? It appears far more likely that the cat exists as an external item that wandered across the room (Gowen et al., 2015). Consider how we could explain the cat’s hunger. I had seen him in the morning, and the next time I encountered him, it was at night, and he was hungry. If the cat only existed as sensory data when I observe him, he did not exist in the intermediate. Therefore it is odd that he is hungry right now. However, if we consider mind-independent things, it becomes clear why the cat becomes hungry (or at least exhibits hunger-like behaviors). And how do sense-data collectors get hungry? Now apply the same logic to people’s complicated activities and behaviors. Does it make sense? Possessing mind-independent entities simplifies our understanding of the world.
Idealism on the sense of data
“Whatever can be recognized to exist, should be in some manner mental,” according to the idealism theory. This doctrine’s nature contradicts our commonsense belief that every day, physical objects such as the table or the sun are made out of something utterly distinct from what we term “mind” or “thoughts.” We imagine the outside world as self-contained and containing actual objects constituted of substance. Idealism is much more difficult to believe than the common sense viewpoint. Russell asserted in the previous chapter that the way physical objects exist differs dramatically from our understanding of sense-data, even though they have a connection.
Neither this relationship nor common sense supported the possibility of understanding the true nature of the outer world directly. It consequently seemed premature to dismiss idealism because it contradicts common sense. Russell starts with Bishop Berkeley’s arguments. Berkeley’s philosophy was couched in the framework of a theory of knowledge. He reasoned that the objects of experience, our sense-data, must be dependent on us because the sense-data would cease to exist if we ceased hearing, tasting, seeing, or experiencing. It must exist in some form in a person’s thoughts. Berkeley’s logic is “legitimate,” according to Russell. Further extrapolations, on the other hand, are less reliable.
Berkeley went on to say that the only things about which our judgments could be sure were sense data. All things that could have been comprehended existed in a mind because sense-data existed in it. Some mind created reality, and any “object” that does not originate in another mind doesn’t exist (Pröller et al., 2016). The components of sense-data, or items that might be immediately understood, were dubbed “ideas” by Berkeley. Memories and imagined objects could also be instantly recognized due to how the mind operates and were referred to as concepts. Berkeley claims that anything like a plant exists because someone senses it.
Berkeley acknowledged believing in an outside universe apart from humans. His thought claimed that the universe and everything in it was God’s ideas. The continual “physical” item or permanent notion in God’s mind is real. Because our brains share God’s views, various people’s perceptions of the same item vary yet are similar because they are all part of the same thing. Except for these “ideas,” nothing could conceivably exist or be known.
Russell reacts to Berkeley’s idealism by debating the definition of “idea.” Berkeley, according to Russell, develops the use of the term that makes it easier to trust the proponents of idealism, because we consider ideas to be mental entities. When we are informed that a tree is an idea, a simple application of the term “idea” automatically puts the tree in our brains. Russell claims that the concept of anything being “in the mind” is challenging to grasp. We say we have a notion or a person “in mind,” but what we mean is that we have thought about it or him, not the thing itself. As a result, “when Berkeley argues that the tree must be in our thoughts if we are to know it, what he actually means is that an idea of the tree must be in our minds.” Berkeley’s meaning, according to Russell, is “completely muddled.” He tries to figure out how Berkeley interacts with sense data and the physical environment. Berkeley viewed sense-data as a subjective concept that relied on humans for its existence. He made this discovery before attempting to demonstrate that everything that “can be instantly understood” is solely in mind. Russell points out that the finding of sense-data reliance does not lead to the evidence Berkeley is looking for. He would have to establish that “things are revealed to be mental by being known.”
Russell continues to think about the nature of concepts to dissect Berkeley’s arguments. Berkeley uses the same term, “idea,” to refer to two distinct concepts. The first is the awareness of something, such as the color of Russell’s table, while the second is the actual act of apprehension. While the latter behavior seems to be clearly mental, the previous “object” does not. Russell claims that Berkeley creates the illusion of natural agreement between these two definitions of “idea (He, B et al., 2014).” We agree that apprehending occurs in the mind, and as a result, we quickly come to the realization that the objects we apprehend are concepts that exist in the mind as well. This ruse is referred to as “unconscious equivocation” by Russell. We end up thinking that what we can comprehend has always been in our heads, which is Berkeley’s “ultimate error.”
Russell uses the concept of “idea” to distinguish between act and object. He returns to it because he argues it is central to our whole system of information acquisition. Learning and familiarizing oneself with anything necessitates a mental relationship with something other than one’s own mind. If we agree with Berkeley that objects that may be understood exist only in mind, we immediately restrict man’s ability to learn. It is a tautology to claim that what we know is “in the mind” as though we mean “before the mind.” However, this leads to the paradoxical conclusion that whatever is in front of the mind may not be in the mind since it is not mental. Berkeley’s thesis is refuted by the nature of knowing itself. Berkeley’s case for idealism is dismissed by Russell.
Arguments by Russel
Perceptions are a function of viewpoint:
- Color: varies on lighting
- Shape: dependent on the angle
- Touch: depending on how firmly you push on the object
Thus, it becomes evident that the actual table, if there is one, is not the same \sas what we instantly encounter via sight, touch, or hearing. The real \stable, if there is one, is not precisely identified to us at all but must be an \inference from what is presently known.
Let us assign the label of ‘sense-data’ to the elements that are immediately \known in sensation: such elements as colors, sounds, odors, harnesses, \ roughness, and so on…
It is plain that if we are to know anything about \the table, it must’ve been by means of the sense-data — brown color, oblong \shape, smoothness, etc. — which we associate with the table; but, for \the reasons which have been given, we could indeed say that the table is the \sense data, but rather that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a dilemma emerges as to the connection of the sense-data to the actual table, \supposing there is such a thing.
The Simplicity Conclusion
The idea that life is a dream in which we create all the things that appear before us has no logical difficulty. However, while this is not theoretically incoherent, there is no reason to believe it is true; in fact, it is a less simple hypothesis, when viewed as a means of financial reporting for the facts of our own lives, than the commonsense hypothesis that there are objects independent of us whose actions on us cause our sensations. Berkeley, on the other hand, addresses the challenge of returning to Cartesian underpinnings by “downsizing.” He claims that the “external universe” is nothing more than a collection of thoughts. Is this, however, a true solution to the problem? What evidence do we have that there are ideas apart from our own? We have not progressed beyond Descartes’ basis. Therefore, Russell’s argument deems simpler and con be proven.
References
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He, B., Pun, A. B., Zherebetskyy, D., Liu, Y., Liu, F., Klivansky, L. M., … & Liu, Y. (2014). New form of an old natural dye: Bay-annulated indigo (BAI) as an excellent electron-accepting unit for high performance organic semiconductors. Journal of the American Chemical Society, 136(42), 15093-15101.
Pröller, S., Liu, F., Zhu, C., Wang, C., Russell, T. P., Hexemer, A., … & Herzig, E. M. (2016). Following the morphology formation in situ in printed active layers for organic solar cells. Advanced Energy Materials, 6(1), 1501580.
